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The paper describes the eﬀects of the non-funded social security systems over fer-
tility rate and labor supply(typically family choice variables). We show that changes
on ﬁscal policy may induce subsequent changes on family choices which produce an
endogenous problem of sustainability over the social security system.
INTRODUCTION
Governments that manage non-funded social security programs generally face ﬁscal
problems caused by demographic transition as fewer individuals pay taxes but more in-
dividuals receive the social security beneﬁts over time. This process ﬁnally requires the
replacement of the non-funded social security system by a fully-funded system. This
paper addresses this phenomena by stressing a feedback eﬀect from social security to de-
mographic transition. It also shows a negative eﬀect of the non-funded system over labor
supply.
In this scenario, the non-funded system becomes unsustainable because tax rates raise
continuously over time.
THE ENVIRONMENT
In this economy, there is a representative household which has three overlapping gen-
erations: newborns, middle age and elderly individuals. Each middle age individual will
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1solve a dynastic problem that can be written in a recursive setup.
She is endowed with Ht units of human capital and bt units of ﬁnancial wealth obtained
as bequest from her parents. She maximizes a welfare function composed by her current
utility level, her discounted utility level at old age and their children’s discounted utility.
Let ¯ be the individual’s discount factor and, as in Becker, Murphy and Tamura(1990)
-BMT-, let ®n
¡²
t be a constant elasticity function of altruism per children, where nt is
the number of children the individual decides to bear. The instantaneous utility function
will be u(ct)=(ct)¾/¾, where ¾ is the constant elasticity of substitution of consumption.
The individual chooses the number of children to bear, the fraction of time invested on
human capital on each of them (yt), the savings to carry over to next period (st) and the
level of bequest left to each child (bt+1). No constraint is assumed on bequest, meaning
that they could be negative, which is the case of children supporting their parents.
Total income depends on labor income, ﬁnancial return from investments on capital
market and social security payment received during retirement age. Labor income during
adulthood depends on (1) the amount of time supplied to the labor market and (2) the
human capital of the individual. We assume that each individual is endowed with 1 unit
of time which might be used either to work or as an input in childbearing. If she only
works, she provides Ht units of human capital. However, bringing up children takes yt
units of time, and since we have nt children, we are left just with (1-ntyt) units of time
to work. In this case the after tax labor income will be wtHt(1-ntyt)(1-¿t), where wt is
the wage rate per unit of human capital and ¿t is a social security tax rate levied by the
government. Additionally income is obtained as return from the capital market of the
investment of bequests, bt. The capital market pays a rate of return equal to rt. Finally,
during old age each individual receives social security beneﬁts composed by a lump sum
beneﬁt, Gt+1, and a return, Á , over the individual’s contribution.
The evolution of human capital stock over time is described by Ht+1 = Ayµ
tHt, where
A is a technology parameter, Ht is parents’ human capital and Ht+1 is child’s human
capital. The parameters of the model have the following properties:
Assumption 1: 0 < ¯;®;µ;²;¾ < 1;0 < A, µ < ².
Assumption 2: 0 < Á < (1 + rt).
Assumption 3: wt = w and rt = r> 0, 8 t
2Assumption 1 states that parents are selﬁsh (® < 1) as they care more on their own
welfare than on their children’s welfare. The fact that 0 < µ < 1 implies that the rate
of return of investment on human capital is decreasing on yt. The assumptions about
¾ and ² assure that the individual’s utility function is concave on consumption and the
altruism function per child is also concave. The assumption µ < ² assure the existence
and uniqueness of an equilibrium (see below).
The assumption Á < (1 + rt) basically indicates that the system is not fully funded.
Assumption 3 allows us to focus on a small open economy that faces prices. Finally even
when we did not state any assumption on tax rates, it should be noticed that an upper
and a lower bound for taxes exist. In fact, as the government requires positive revenues
we should have ¿t > 0. Also if individuals face ¿t > 1, they would obtain negative labor
income and they would not supply labor. Thus we would require ¿t < 1 to obtain revenues.
This last condition will be used later when deﬁning the sustainability of the system.
Summing up, this setup is similar to BMT, but allowing for three period of time during
lifecycle, a decreasing rate of return on human capital, individuals facing prices -as in any
lifecycle context- and the existence of a social security system. The individual’s problem,
















t = (1 + rt)bt + wtHt(1 ¡ ntyt)(1 ¡ ¿t) ¡ st (2)
co
t+1 = (1 + rt+1)st + ÁwtHt¿t(1 ¡ ntyt) + Gt+1 (3)
Ht+1 = Ayµ
tHt (4)
Where Vt(Ht;bt) is the value function for the individual in her adulthood, given the
human capital stock and assets she carries over while ca
t;co
t+1 are consumption during
adulthood and retirement age respectively. Additionally to assumption 1, to satisfy second
order conditions we require 1-¾ ¡ ² > 0 -as in Becker and Barro (1988)- and 0 < µ < 1.
The ﬁrst order conditions and the envelope conditions determine a set of three equations.
The ﬁrst condition is the following:




1 ¡ ¿t+1 +
Á¿t+1
1+rt+2
1 ¡ ¿t +
Á¿t
1+rt+1
] = 1 + rt+1 = Rk (5)
3The condition equates marginal return from human capital with marginal return from
bequests (ﬁnancial wealth). The ﬁrst term of the left hand side, Aµyµ¡1, is the physical
marginal return on human capital if the individual supply a unit of time to the labor
market. However, the eﬀective return on human capital depends on the amount of time
that each child works, (1-nt+1yt+1). Finally we multiply by the ratio of relative wages
corrected by taxes. Hence this equation determines yt such that at the margin, the rate
of return on human capital is equal to the rate of return on bequests.
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1 ¡ ² ¡ ¾µ
¾
) (7)
Equation (6) is just an Euler equation. The ﬁrst equality assumes a stable growth path.
The right hand side of the equation is the usual discount factor corrected by interest rate
and fertility rate. Equation (7) states that the ratio of bequest versus next period human
capital is function of relative prices. The bigger is the wage rate, the more the individual
is willing to supply eﬀective human capital to the market. In that case, less time is
available for investment on children’s human capital and parents substitute away from
investment on human capital to bequests. The bigger is the return on human capital,
the more human capital is accumulated and thus the less work is supplied. In this case,
the ratio of bequest to human capital decreases because at the margin, parents prefer to
spent on children’s human capital rather than on bequests.
We have a system of three equations that determines the family decision variables.
Equations (5) and (6) fully interact and jointly determine the number of children and the
time spent on human capital accumulation on each child. Given the value of yt, the ratio
of bequest to human capital is determined.
Lemma 1. Under assumptions 1-3, there exists a unique and stationary equilibrium
(n*,y*, b¤
H¤).
Proof: See mathematical appendix.
Notice that given those values we can calculate the stationary level of per capita income
growth on the dynastic family, g*=Ay*µ, and the level of stationary aggregate growth of
the family’s income, (1+g*)n*.
4The set of equation that determine optimal allocations depends on the parameters of
the model including the tax rate. We analyze next how ﬁscal policy might aﬀect the
household’s allocations. The following proposition states the eﬀect of a change on ¿t over
y*, n* and (1+g*)n* when Á <(1+g*)n*. This case is stressed here because the rate of
return provided by governments is generally smaller than the aggregate growth rate of
the economy -See Song (2000).
Proposition 1. When Á <(1+g*)n* and assumptions 1-3 hold, an increase in the social
security tax rate at time t, ¿t, impacts negatively fertility rate -n*- and labor supply.
Proof: See Mathematical appendix
The intuition of those results is the following. Consider an increase on ¿t holding
constant the level of beneﬁts. This case is associated with a current superavit on the ﬁscal
budget which will be returned to future generations. Thus there is not a direct income
eﬀect over the family budget constraint. However, there might exist a substitution eﬀect.
In fact, the family has two options two allocate its time: (1) working or (2) childbearing.
As government is taxing labor income there is an eﬀect over the current return of labor
supply while future return of labor supply (the social security component, Á) is held
constant though.
Will the household allocate more time to childbearing? It depends on childbearing
return. This return is determined by the increase on future family income. In fact as we
spent more time on children, the family will have larger aggregated future income due to
larger human capital accumulation (holding constant fertility rate) or to larger fertility
rate (large number of individuals, holding constant human capital). Thus this return is
given by the aggregate growth rate of the economy, n*(1+g*).
As the tax rate increases, the family compares the old-age return of working versus
childbearing. If Á < n¤(1+g¤), there are incentives to allocate more time to childbearing
and current labor supply decrease. Also as there will be more resources available to future
resources, the current generation is able to leave a smaller level of bequests (which might
be even negative) which is accomplish by choosing a smaller level of children and fewer
bequest per children. Thus when Á < n¤(1+g¤), we obtain lower labor supply and lower
fertility rate but larger human capital accumulation.
5THE PATH OF TAXES OVER TIME ON THE NON-FUNDED SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM
In this section, we focus on determining if the ﬁscal system is sustainable. A sustainable
system will be understood as a system where the government is able of collecting revenues
to pay the social security beneﬁts. The next deﬁnition illustrates the idea.
Deﬁnition 1. A non-funded social security system is sustainable if the ﬁscal budget
balances and ¿t < 1;8t.
The above deﬁnition rules out cases where ¿t > 1 simply because in that case individuals
do not obtain labor income when supplying labor and thus they prefer not to work.
Whenever ¿t < 1, the government is able to collect positive revenues.
The government promises to pay some beneﬁts during retirement age. We assume that
those promises are not broken and the government adjusts its level of taxes if required to
keep in balance the ﬁscal budget.
Thus the government has the following budget constraint:
nt¿t+1wt+1(1 ¡ nt+1yt+1)Ht+1 = Á¿twt(1 ¡ ntyt)Ht + Gt+1 (8)
Assuming a stable growth path and the lump sum level of beneﬁt being equal to a




]¿t + ° (9)
This equation indicates the determinant of tax rates over time. The rate of return of
social security system plays a main role. In fact if Á is bigger than the aggregate growth
rate of the economy, n¤(1+g¤), tax rate increases continuously over time. Consider next





n¤(1+g¤)¡Á. However n¤(1+g¤) is a function of tax rate -as shown above- and
thus the tax rate might not converge to a stable value and further it might raise over time
as in the former case. This continuous increase of tax rates would produce the system to
become unsustainable.
6The next proposition states the main result of this section.
Assumption 4: 0 < Á < n¤(1 + g¤)
Proposition 2. When assumption 1-4 hold, the social security tax raises continuously
and the system becomes unsustainable in a ﬁnite time horizon.
Proof: See mathematical appendix.
The main intuition for the result is the following. The government might keep the level
of taxes stable if it is able to collect enough revenues to pay the social security beneﬁts.
This tax collection depends on the aggregate growth rate of the economy. However n¤(1+
g¤) is negatively aﬀected by an increase on social security tax due to the negative eﬀect on
fertility rate and on labor supply. Thus an exogenous increase on tax rate require larger
tax rates in the future to collect enough revenues to pay the beneﬁts.
CONCLUSION
The paper shows that the non-funded social security system might become unsustain-
able under fairly weak assumptions. The main force driving the result is an endogenous
demographic transition produced by the system. Thus the ﬁscal problems caused by de-
mographic transition which ﬁnally requires the implementation of a fully funded system
are -at least partly- caused by the non-funded system itself.
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
Proof of lemma 1





1 ¡ ¿t+1 +
Á¿t+1
1+rt+2
1 ¡ ¿t +
Á¿t
1+rt+1
] = 1 + rt+1 ) yI = yI(n)
(Ayµ)¾ = ¯®n
¡²
t (1 + rt+1) ) yII = yII(n)
As technology and tastes are smooth continuous functions, so are the above functions.
Also those equations imply that as n!0, yI ! 1 while yII ! [(1 + r)=Aµ]
1
µ¡1.
















Both elasticies are negatives and furthermore the elasticity (I) is always larger in ab-
solute value than the one of (II). The proof is by contradiction. Suppose the elasticity of













) 1 > ny >
²
1 ¡ ¾ ¡ ²
1µ
µ
Since 1> ny by time constraint, (1 ¡ ¾ ¡ ²) > 0 by SOC. Thus the inequality requires
² < µ(1 ¡ ¾) which is a contradiction by assumption 1. Thus the slope of (I) is always
larger than the one of (II) in absolute values.
It follows that both lines cross once on the plane (y,n) and thus a unique stationary
equilibrium exists. Q.E.D.
8Proof of proposition 1




























































Notice that assumptions Á < (1 + r) and ¿ < 1 imply f< 0 when Á < n(1 + g) and by
second order conditions det(A) > 0.





































ny > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2
The evolution of taxes follows equation (5). However we should notice that the aggregate





]¿t + ° ) ¿t+1 = ¿t+1(¿t) (12)
















f(1 ¡ ¾ ¡ ²)µ
det(A)
< 0
9Where the last inequality follows from SOC and f < 0.
To study the evolution of taxes over time, we linearize equation (12) by using the Euler
method to obtain:









(1 ¡ ¾ ¡ ²)µf
det(A)
)¿t (13)
Thus it follows that the change of taxes over time is:




(1 ¡ ¾ ¡ ²)µf¿t
det(A)
) (14)
Fix any initial positive level of taxes, ¿t > 0 and assume that tax rate decreases over
time. Thus we should have:
1 <
(1 ¡ ¾ ¡ ²)µf¿t
det(A)
(15)
But this is a contradiction because ¿t > 0 and f < 0. Thus tax rate increase unam-
biguously over time. Q.E.D.
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